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6 March 1964

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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Rumania-USSR: Bucharest and Moscow may be involved in a new disagreement over basic economic policies.

The Rumanian representative at the Soviet-sponsored Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) at his request met with Soviet First Deputy Premier Kosygin in late February on the eve of a CEMA Executive Committee meeting. In reporting that the meeting between the two men took place, neither the Soviet nor Rumanian press described it in the usual manner as "friendly," and neither has reported it further.

Rumanian central committee members have been conducting provincial party meetings since early January, probably in order to rally support for a new confrontation with Moscow.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Dominican Republic: The regime may become more authoritarian because of continued uneasiness in the government about alleged opposition plots.

The severity of the police crackdown on Santo Domingo taxi drivers who went on strike on 2 March is indicative of this. Nearly 200 persons were arrested, numerous taxis seized, and three radio stations temporarily shut down on charges of supporting the strikers.

There is a widespread belief within the government that the strike is part of a coup plot by elements sympathetic to ex-President Joaquin Balaguer. As a result, strong-arm tactics may be used with increasing frequency against the government's political opponents.

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DAILY BRIEF

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NOTES

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South Korea - Japan: Kim Chong-pil, chairman of South Korea's governing party, plans to visit Tokyo in mid-March to try to break the deadlock in the negotiations for normalizing Japanese - South Korean relations. Kim hopes to discuss fisheries, the last major issue blocking a settlement, with Prime Minister Ikeda and other leading government politicians. Kim's mission offers an important chance to achieve an agreement in time for ratification by the Japanese Diet before it adjourns late this spring.

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Bolivia: Federico Fortun, President Paz' hand-picked running mate in next June's election, has resigned in favor of air force commander Rene Barrientos. Paz' acquiescence in this development was apparently motivated by a belief that his personal popularity as well as the MNR's has been slipping lately, and that acceptance of Barrientos on the MNR ticket would help keep military support in line.

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Gabon: French troops have quelled this week's antigovernment demonstrations in Libreville and the general strike which began on 2 March apparently has ended. Many of the demonstrators reportedly have been arrested, reducing, at least for the present, the chances of further disturbances. Although the tough methods of the French may have intimidated some Gabonese, hostility toward President Mba and toward Paris has been greatly heightened.

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